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PRESERVATION: WHAT IS IT GOOD
FOR?
Yuval Simchi-Levi1
In the United States of America, appellate courts must
balance efficiency with justice when dealing with criminal
cases. In order to make the system more efficient, certain
procedural constraints have been put into place. For instance,
in a criminal appeal in many American jurisdictions, an
appellate court is often limited to considering issues properly
raised before that court by a rule referred to as the
“preservation doctrine.”2 This doctrine is a source of tension for
American appellate courts in dealing with criminal cases
because it has the potential to conflict with their ability to
achieve justice.3
In New York, intermediate appellate courts are permitted
to review factual issues in criminal cases.4 However, the Court
of Appeals, which is New York’s highest court, is not permitted
to do so.5 The Court of Appeals is restricted, to a great extent,
to decide only legal issues properly raised at trial.6 In other
words, the Court of Appeals can review, for the most part, only
legal claims that were properly preserved at trial.7 As this
1. Yuval Simchi-Levi is an Assistant District Attorney in the New York
County District Attorney’s Office. The views expressed in this article are his
own. The author wishes to thank Craig Ascher, David M. Cohn, and Timothy
C. Stone for their valuable comments and insight.
2. Richard J. Montes & David A. Beatty, The Preservation Rule in the
New York Court of Appeals: How Recent Decisions and Characterizations of
the Rule Inform Advocacy, 78 ALB. L. REV. 119, 120-22 (2015).
3. Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive
Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1263
(2002).
4. N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., THE NEW YORK STATE COURTS: AN
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE, http://nycourts.gov/reports/ctstrct99.pdf.
5. About
the
Court,
N.Y.
ST.
UNIFIED
CT.
SYS.,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad2/aboutthecourt.shtml (last visited Nov.
28, 2016).
6. Id.
7. Appealability and Reviewability, N.Y. ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS.,
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paper will demonstrate, over the past few years, the Court of
Appeals has broadened its interpretation of the preservation
doctrine at the cost of efficiently reviewing cases.
The tension that the New York Court of Appeals faces as a
court of law is emblematic of a challenge that many appellate
courts face in the United States. Courts have to grapple with
the following questions: Should an appellate court be restricted
by technical rules from examining a legal issue that could lead
to the right result for the sake of efficiency? Likewise, should a
person suffer due to his trial attorney’s failure to interpose
arguments at trial? The American appellate system has
struggled with how best to deal with these questions.
How a state’s criminal justice system deals with these
issues matters. For instance, as has been well-documented, the
New York City criminal courts are struggling to deal with a
backlog of criminal cases due to pre-trial delays.8
Consequently, many individuals are “languishing” in prison as
they await an ultimate disposition in their cases.9 As this
paper will show, how the New York Court of Appeals deals
with procedural constraints on its scope of review similarly has
a direct impact on the backlog of criminal cases awaiting
review by that court.
The Article proceeds as follows: in Part A, the preservation
doctrine is defined. In Part B, the history of the preservation
doctrine is described. In Part C, there is an explanation as to
the purpose of preservation. In Part D, there is a description of
the appellate process in New York. In Part E, the statutory
rules of the New York Court of Appeals are described. In Part
F, there is a description of how the rules of preservation have
loosened in New York since 2009. In Part G, there is a
statistical analysis of the consequences of loosening the rules of
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/forms/civil5_05.htm (last visited Nov. 28,
2016).
8. William Glaberson, Even for Minor Crimes in Bronx, No Guarantee of
Getting a Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1; William Glaberson, For 3
Years After Killing, Evidence Fades as a Suspect Sits in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2013, at A1; William Glaberson, Courts in Slow Motion, Aided by the
Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, at A1; William Glaberson, Waiting Years
for Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2013, at A1.
9. Michael Sfchwirtz & Michael Winerip, Push to Reduce Total at Rikers
Aims at Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2015, at A1.
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preservation in New York.
Finally, Part H shows how
loosening the rules of preservation impacts the efficiency of
appellate courts.
I.
What is the Preservation Doctrine?
To preserve a claim for appellate review, three general
prerequisites must be satisfied.10 First, there must actually be
a specific ruling made by a trial judge.11 Second, a party must
have suggested to the trial judge that the ruling was wrong.12
Third, if the trial court did not correct its ruling, the aggrieved
party can appeal the ruling to an appellate court.13 In other
words, in order for an attorney to argue on appeal that the
judge erred during the trial, the attorney must object to the
court’s decision at trial and state why the attorney disagrees
with the judge’s ruling.
II.
Historical Analysis of Preservation
The tension in American appellate law as to whether
appellate courts should be constrained to review certain
developed issues or should adopt a more flexible notion of
appeal is a byproduct of having adopted the American legal
system from England, where there were courts of law and
equity with their own separate appellate processes.14 During
the Roman Empire, parties could re-litigate claims with new
evidence.15 In England, by the end of the twelfth century, the
appeal would go from a local court, to a court of the
archbishops, “and then to the courts of the Pope.”16 However,
because in this appellate system there were few procedural
requirements, there was an “almost unlimited right of appeal

10. Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S 523 (1983).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; see Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The
General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (1987).
14. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 913, 915 (1997).
15. Id. at 928.
16. Id. at 929. See generally MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX AND
MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1570-1640, 35-37 (1987).
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to the Pope.”17
The American understanding of appellate law evolved from
the eighteenth century English common law. The notion of
preservation specifically developed from the English writ of
error model, which governed criminal proceedings.18 Under
that legal system, a trial judge’s authority was limited to
questions of law, while the jury served as the fact-finder.19 To
appeal a judgment, a writ of error was required, in which the
party appealing the judgment alleged that the trial judge made
an error.20
Preservation of legal issues was significant under the writ
of error.21 The only way to determine if a trial judge had made
an error was to review the record, which consisted “only of
formal documents filed in court and the official record of the
actions of the jury and the judge.”22 And, because what
occurred at trial could not be recorded verbatim, a procedure —
the bill of exceptions — developed, where a party who
disagreed with a court’s ruling could challenge it and request
that a third party record, in writing, the judge’s ruling and the
aggrieved party’s exception to the ruling.23 That written record
would then be sent to the appellate court as part of the
appeal.24
At the same time, in England, there were courts of equity
where judges would dispense justice as they saw appropriate
based on the facts of the cases before them.25 An appellate
17. Bilder, supra note 14, at 929 (quoting 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 213-14 (7th ed. 1956)).
18. Sean Arthurs, Comment and Casenote, A Foolish Consistency: How
Refusing to Review Ford v. Garcia’s Invited Error Demonstrates the Eleventh
Circuit’s Prioritization of Procedure Over Justice, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1707,
1710 (2004); Nora Meltzer, Note, Dismissing the Foster Children, The Eleven
Circuit’s Misapplication and Improper Expansion of The Younger Abstention
Doctrine in Bonnie L. v. Bush, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 635, 642 (2004). See also
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971).
19. Arthurs, supra note 18, at 1710-11.
20. Martineau, supra note 13, at 1026.
21. Id. at 1026-27; see generally ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE
IN CIVIL CASES 38-71 (1941).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Miller, supra note 3, at 1263.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/5

4

2016

PRESERVATION: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?

179

court in equity could consider any issue on appeal regardless of
whether it was preserved or not.26 As a result, the appellate
court reviewed the entire case regardless of whether an issue
had previously been raised to the trial court.27
In the United States, the appellate courts have decided to
follow the writ of error model, rather than the equity courts’
model.28 Indeed, although initially eight colonies in the United
States adopted the more liberal appellate system, in which the
appellate court could consider any legal or factual issue
regardless of whether it was preserved, many of those colonies
“replace[d] or combine[d]” their appellate systems with
preservation requirements, such as writ of error or writ of
certiorari.29 And, by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
American courts only allowed appeals for errors of law that
could be found in the “written record of the case.”30
The emphasis on procedure in early American criminal law
can be traced to the significance of the adversarial system in
American law, which was far more advanced than the
adversarial system under English law. For instance, as to
whether defendants should receive the full assistance of
defense counsel, American criminal law actually “preceded”
England by guaranteeing that right by the 1780s, while
England only accepted that concept by the mid-nineteenth
century.31 America embraced the adversary system because it
was consistent with the “new American” concepts of crime,

26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Martineau, supra note 13, at 1027.
Id. at 1027-28.
Bilder, supra note 14, at 914-915; see also 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801 119-26 (2009); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE
IN COLONIAL AMERICA 35-36 (1992); ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 23
(1990).
30. Bilder, supra note 14, at 915; see generally POUND, supra note 21, at
72-73, 80-81.
31. Randolph N. Jonakait, Symposium, The Rise of the American
Adversary System: America Before England, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 323, 327
(2009) [hereinafter American Adversary System]; see also Randolph N.
Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 95-96 (1995) [hereinafter Origins of the Confrontation
Clause].
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checks and balances, and societal order.32 The appellate courts
in the United States were criticized for focusing on procedure
instead of justice.33 Consequently, American appellate system
reforms between 1900 and World War II directed the appellate
courts to examine the merits of a claim instead of procedural
errors.34 For instance, in New York during this time period (as
will be discussed in further depth, infra), the legislature
broadened the review power of the appellate courts such that
the intermediate appellate courts in New York could review
issues of fact.35
III.
Preservation: What is it Good For?
Preservation serves several important purposes, such as
promoting efficiency, reducing gamesmanship, and reducing
the caseload for appellate courts. Preservation encourages
efficiency by requiring parties to raise objections as soon as
possible at the trial level.36 After all, if a party objects to a
court’s ruling, the party has given the trial court an
opportunity to correct or explain its decision.37 And, if the trial
court disagrees with the objecting party and makes an
erroneous ruling, the appellate court benefits from a fullydeveloped record.38
Further, preservation discourages gamesmanship because
it prevents a party from saving a critical argument until
appeal.39 In other words, requiring preservation of an issue
before it can be raised on appeal requires attorneys to fully
litigate a case and create a record for appellate review. Thus, a
trial attorney cannot simply hope that, on appeal, an issue will
be discovered that will undermine the trial verdict.40
32. Origins of the Confrontation Clause, supra note 31, at 108.
33. Martineau, supra note 13, at 1028.
34. Id.
35. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(6) (1970).
36. Larry Cunningham, Appellate Review of Unpreserved Questions in
Criminal Cases: An Attempt to Define the “Interest of Justice,” 11 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 293 (2010).
37. See generally Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Tr. Co., 322 A.2d 114, 116
(Pa. 1973); see Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293.
38. Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293.
39. Id. at 285-86.
40. See generally Dilliplaine, 322 A.2d at 116.
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Appellate courts in the United States are overwhelmed
with too many cases and not enough judges and staff to review
them in a timely manner.41 The preservation requirement
reduces the caseload for appellate courts because it limits the
claims that appellate courts can review.42 Of course, any more
time spent by an appellate court on a case delays the
consideration of other cases by that court.43 Even more
significantly, while an appellate court reviews an unpreserved
claim, a litigant, who has raised a preserved meritorious claim,
may be waiting for that same court to review his claim.
Ultimately, requiring litigants to preserve their appellate
claims ensures that appellate courts review the issues that
litigants raised at trial and “about which there was some
disagreement.”44 The preservation doctrine “thus encourages
truth-seeking, the efficient resolution of the case, and the
conservation of appellate resources.”45
IV.
New York’s Appellate Process
New York’s appellate system has two-tiers: an
intermediate appellate court, referred to as the Appellate
Division, and the highest appellate court, the Court of
Appeals.46 In New York, defendants in criminal cases have an
41. Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293; see generally Dione Christopher
Greene, Note, The Federal Courts of Appeals, Unpublished Decisions, and the
“No-Citation Rule,” 81 IND. L.J. 1503, 1505-07 (2006) (explaining five factors
that contribute to the overburdening of federal courts of appeals: (1) caseload
expansion caused by population growth; (2) “new statutory rights[;]” (3)
“retention of diversity jurisdiction[;]” (4) crime; and (5) “miscellaneous
factors” such as free legal services and more lawyers in general, and noting,
in addition, that consequences include an expansion in judicial staff). See
also Developments and Practice Notes, Expedited Appeals in Selected State
Appellate Courts, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 191 (2002) (detailing approaches
used to combat the “caseload crisis” in appellate courts and characterizing
crisis as equally significant in state and federal appellate courts).
42. See generally In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 360
(3d Cir. 2010) (Weis, J., dissenting); see Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293.
43. Martineau, supra note 13, at 1032.
44. Cunningham, supra note 36, at 293; see Martineau, supra note 13,
at 1029-30.
45. Cunningham, supra note 36, at 286; see also ARTHUR KARGER, THE
POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 77 (Thompson/West 3d ed. rev.
2005).
46. Cunningham, supra note 36, at 305.
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“automatic right to an appeal” to the intermediate appellate
courts.47 However, there is no automatic right to appeal to the
Court of Appeals in criminal cases, except in death penalty
cases.48 An appeal to the Court of Appeals is available by
permission of a Judge of the Court of Appeals or a Justice of
the Appellate Division.49
There is another key difference between New York’s
intermediate appellate courts and the Court of Appeals. The
intermediate appellate courts can review both issues of law and
fact, and are permitted to set aside a conviction as “a matter of
discretion in the interest of justice.”50 In contrast, the Court of
Appeals cannot review factual questions or set aside a
conviction by exercising its discretion; instead, the Court of
Appeals can only review questions of law.51 The New York
Court of Appeals is therefore a court of law.52
It bears noting that New York allows defendants to raise
certain post-conviction claims initially in a trial court; for
instance, in New York, if a defendant believes his trial attorney
did not provide him with meaningful representation, he can
initiate post-conviction proceedings to set aside his conviction
by filing a motion to a trial court.53 In a similar vein, if a
defendant learns of newly discovered evidence that exonerates
him, he can move to set aside his conviction via a postconviction proceeding.54
V.
New York’s Court of Law
The Court of Appeals became a court of law because of “the
clogged calendars and inordinate delays” that the Court had to
deal with during its earlier periods when it did not have the
same limitations as it does now.55 “From the time of its
47. Id.
48. KARGER, supra note 45, at 5.
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(4)-(6) (1970); see also People v.
Michael, 394 N.E.2d 1134, 1135 (N.Y. 1979); KARGER, supra note 45, at 5;
Cunningham, supra note 36, at 305-06.
51. KARGER, supra note 45, at 704-05.
52. Id.
53. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(f) (2015).
54. § 440.10(1)(g).
55. KARGER, supra note 45, at 4.
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inception in 1847 until comparatively recently, the history of
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals revolved around its
struggle to cope with the demands of a volume of business
exceeding its capacity.”56 In fact, at its inception, the Court of
Appeals received a backlog of 1500 pending appeals from its
predecessor, the Court for the Correction of Errors.57
Legislation was enacted in 1848 to limit appeals to the Court of
Appeals, but a series of subsequent amendments broadened the
scope of the cases that the Court of Appeals could review.58
Because the Court of Appeals scope of review was broadened,
allowing it to review more cases, “the Court was gradually
overwhelmed by the volume of appeals.”59
Although New York’s Constitution of 1894 rigidly limited
the Court to the review of questions of law, it created an
exception for criminal capital cases.60 By the end of the
nineteenth century, cases could pend for as long as four years
before the Court of Appeals.61 By 1915, it took two years for a
case to be resolved in the Court of Appeals.62 In 1917, many of
the “jurisdictional limitations in effect today” were formulated
and put into the Judiciary Article of the State Constitution that
was adopted in 1925.63 Restrictions put in place at that time,
as well as “subsequent amendments and statutory changes,”
have allowed the Court of Appeals to reduce its backlog of
cases.64 Indeed, during the early part of the twentieth century,
the Court of Appeals applied the preservation doctrine strictly;
for instance, in People v. Pindar,65 the Court of Appeals went as
56. Id. at 19.
57. Id. at 19-20.
58. Id. at 20. “The finality requirement is a standard limitation on
appealability imposed by many jurisdictions. The doctrine, which is found in
civil law, provides that “no appeal as of right or motion for leave to appeal in
a civil matter may be entertained . . . unless the judgment or order sought to
be appealed from is final determination.” Id. at 33-34. The concept of finality
was added to the New York State Constitution in 1894, and subsequently
codified in CPLR 5611. Id. at 36-37.
59. Id. at 20.
60. KARGER, supra note 45, at 5.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. People v. Pindar, 104 N.E. 133 (N.Y. 1914).
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far as to state that defense counsel’s objections to a prosecutor’s
summation did not preserve the claim for appeal because “[t]he
law does not contemplate exceptions to the conduct of
counsel . . . .”66
By 1946, the Code of Criminal Procedure Law 420-a
relaxed the state’s preservation rules. Specifically, the statute
noted that an
exception shall be deemed to have been taken by
the party adversely affected to every ruling
either before or after the cause is finally
submitted, when such party, at the time when
the ruling is sought or made, makes known to
the court or judge his position thereon by
objection or otherwise.67
In 1970, and subsequently in 1986, the preservation rule
was amended to its current form.68 Currently, New York
defines questions of law in criminal cases as those “preserved
for appellate review by appropriate motion, objection or protest
in the court of first instance.”69 Specifically, a question of law
in criminal cases is “presented when a protest thereto was
registered, by the party claiming error, at the time of such
ruling or instruction or at any subsequent time when the court
had an opportunity” to change its ruling.70 Such a protest has
been sufficiently raised when the party made its position
known to the court “with respect to a [particular] ruling or
instruction,” or “if in response to a protest by a party, the court
expressly decided the question raised on appeal.”71 For the
most part, for an error “to present a question of law reviewable
by the Court of Appeals . . . the claim . . . [must] have been
preserved for appellate review by an appropriate motion,
66. Id. at 135.
67. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 420-a (1946) (current version at N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 470.05(2) (1986)).
68. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05 (1986) (original version at ch.
996, § 1 (1970)).
69. KARGER, supra note 45, at 704-05.
70. § 470.05(2).
71. Id.
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objection, protest or other action in the court of first
instance.”72 Over the past 100 years in New York, the
statutory definition of preservation has evolved from a hypertechnical definition to a looser, more flexible definition.
The modern Court of Appeals has made clear that an aim
of New York’s preservation rule is to emphasize to the parties
in a criminal proceeding their responsibility in “calling the
attention of the court to errors of law which adversely affect a
client [a]t a time when such errors are correctible.”73 Otherwise,
the Court of Appeals has explained that, if the lawyers could
“sit idly by” as an error was committed and claim that error on
appeal, “the State’s fundamental interest in enforcing its
criminal law could be frustrated by delay and waste of time
and resources invited by a defendant.”74 Thus, in dealing with
criminal cases, the Court of Appeals must balance achieving
justice in criminal cases while, at the same time, not
interpreting the rule of preservation or the Court’s power in
such a way that yields inefficiency within the criminal justice
system.
VI.

Loosening the Rules of Preservation in New
York
Since 2009, the clash between procedural rules and the
appellate court’s obligation to do justice has become even more
profound in New York. A number of decisions from the Court
of Appeals in the past few years indicates that the Court is
seeking to loosen the rules of preservation, permitting it to
address more cases. Indeed, one judge on the Court of Appeals
even went so far as to state that preservation is a mere
technicality invoked by prosecutors who have a “wellestablished tendency to pounce on every arguable imperfection
in a defense lawyer’s argument as a barrier to deciding a case
on the merits.”75 In such cases, some judges urge that the
“specific objection requirement” of New York’s preservation
72. KARGER, supra note 45, at 746.
73. People v. Robinson, 326 N.E.2d 784, 789 (N.Y. 1975) (emphasis
added).
74. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 902 (N.Y. 1976).
75. People v. Beasley, 946 N.E.2d 166, 169 (N.Y. 2011) (Smith, J.,
concurring).
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doctrine need “not be applied in the overly technical way . . . .”76
Recently, in People v. Finch, the Court dealt with a
defendant who had been arrested on three separate dates
within one month, and had successfully appealed to the Court
of Appeals his conviction stemming from his third arrest.77 The
majority of the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had
preserved an argument for appellate review, even though he
made that argument to a judge during his second arrest before
even committing the crime that was the subject of the appeal.78
Two judges dissented in Finch. Judge Abdus-Salaam
pointed out that the majority’s interpretation of the
preservation rule was inconsistent with its previous
interpretations of the preservation rule, since the majority
appeared to find that defendant had made an objection, despite
the fact that he had yet to even commit the disputed crime.79
Indeed, Judge Abdus-Salaam pointed out that the case
illustrated one of the “primary rationales for the preservation
doctrine, namely the complete development of the defendant’s
claim and the swift determination of guilt or non-guilt,” which
“would be undermined were appellate review permitted under
such circumstances.”80 Since the defendant did not make his
objection during the proceedings arising from his third arrest,
the trial court was “deprived of the opportunity to ‘advanc[e]
both the truth-seeking purpose of the trial and the goal of swift
and final determination of guilt or nonguilt of . . . defendant.’”81
Judge Read also dissented, writing that she hoped that the
majority’s interpretation of the preservation doctrine was an
“adventure in result-oriented decision making,” which “will be
looked upon in retrospect as an aberration, not a harbinger.”82
In People v. Albergotti, the Court of Appeals found that a
claim had been preserved by the defense attorney even though
the “defendant did not specifically complain to the court” about

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

People v. Chestnut, 973 N.E.2d 697, 700 n.2 (N.Y. 2010).
People v. Finch, 15 N.E.3d 307, 308-09 (N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 314-15 (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting).
Id. at 320.
Id. (citing People v. Hawkins, 900 N.E.2d 946, 950 (N.Y. 2008)).
Id. at 328 (Read, J., dissenting).
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the grievance that he was arguing at the Court of Appeals.83
Similarly, in People v. Chestnut, the Court of Appeals found a
defense argument preserved even though, as the dissent
pointed out, the defense’s argument to the trial court was based
on a different ground than what it argued on appeal.84
Still, further evidence indicates that the Court of Appeals
has increasingly abandoned procedural restrictions to review
the merits of more criminal cases. As noted, in New York, for a
defendant to claim that his attorney was ineffective at trial, he
generally has to file a post-conviction motion pursuant to CPL
440.10 to a trial court to expand the record so that the trial
court can make findings of fact as to whether the trial attorney
was ineffective.85 However, where it is apparent from the
record that a trial attorney has been ineffective, such a postconviction motion is not required for an appellate court to
determine whether an attorney was ineffective at trial.86 From
2009 to 2014, the Court of Appeals dispensed with the CPL
440.10 requirement four times in reversing convictions.87 From
1999 until 2008, the Court of Appeals dispensed with that
requirement only twice.88
VII.

Consequences of Loosening Preservation
Rules
As noted, a critical argument in favor of the preservation
rule is that it promotes efficiency in the appellate system.
Indeed, as discussed earlier, in the nineteenth century, the
Court of Appeals had a significant backlog of cases.89 To help
reduce the backlog, restrictions were imposed on what the
Court of Appeals could review.90 Further restrictions were
imposed by 1925, such as the enactment of a preservation rule,
83. People v. Albergotti, 952 N.E.2d 1010, 1010 (N.Y. 2011).
84. Chestnut, 973 N.E.2d at 702-03 (Read, J., dissenting).
85. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (2012).
86. See People v. Satterfield, 488 N.E.2d 834, 836 (N.Y. 1985).
87. See People v. Clermont, 999 N.E.2d 1149 (N.Y. 2013); People v.
Oathout, 989 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 2013); People v. Nesbitt, 988 N.E.2d 478 (N.Y.
2013); People v. Fisher, 967 N.E.2d 676 (N.Y. 2012).
88. People v. Lewis, 809 N.E.2d 1106 (N.Y. 2004); People v. Berroa, 782
N.E.2d 1148 (N.Y. 2002).
89. KARGER, supra note 45, at 20.
90. Id. at 4.
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since around that time, the Court of Appeals had a two-year
backlog of cases.91
Unsurprisingly, as the Court of Appeals has loosened its
interpretation of the preservation rule, the Court has had to
deal with a larger caseload, has taken longer to decide cases,
and has issued more decisions. To be sure, it is possible that in
the vast majority of cases that the Court of Appeals has
recently reviewed, there is a clear question of law. But, as the
history of the Court of Appeals has shown, whenever the rules
of preservation are relaxed or not strictly enforced, the number
of cases that the court deals with sharply increases.
As discussed earlier, prior to the twentieth century, when
the Court did not have a strict preservation doctrine, it had an
unmanageable caseload and took as long as four years to
resolve cases.92 By 1915, the Court of Appeals had a two-year
lag time, and as a result, in 1917, the legislature took action
and crafted a strict preservation law to limit the number of
criminal cases that the Court of Appeals could review.93 Thus,
the Court should be cautious as to how it interprets the
preservation doctrine to avoid repeating the inefficiencies of
the past.
Indeed, over the past six years, the Court of Appeals has
dealt with a dramatic increase in the number of criminal cases
that it deals with, and it takes appreciably longer to decide
them. This is especially clear when comparing the period of
time from 1998-2003 to 2009-2014.
Year

Average number
of days from filing
to disposition
220
230
217
193

199894
199995
200096
200197
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Filed
Cases

Criminal

82
63
68
68

Decided Criminal
Cases
74
62
68
42

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
1998 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § A(1)-(3).
1999 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3).
2000 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3).
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2016
200298
200399
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229
259

60
55

189

67
46

Between 1998 and 2003, the Court of Appeals, on average,
took about 225 days from the filing of a case before deciding
it.100 In that same period, an average of sixty-six cases were
submitted to the Court, and on average, about sixty cases were
decided by the Court.101
The six-year period from 2009 to 2014 stands in stark
contrast to the previous six-year period between 1998 and
2003:
Year

2009102
2010103
2011104
2012105
2013106
2014107

Average time from
filing
to
disposition
of
criminal cases
275
317
375
368
375
403

Filed
Cases

102
120
87
105
89
91

Criminal

Decided Criminal
Cases

66
99
112
91
111
91

During the period from 2009 to 2014, 352 days on average
would pass from the date a case was filed until the Court of
Appeals decided the case, a difference of 127 days more than
from the period from 1998 to 2003.108 From 2009 to 2014, an
average of ninety-nine cases were filed in the Court of Appeals
97. 2001 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3).
98. 2002 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3)
99. 2003 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at § I(B)(1)-(3).
100. See supra notes 87-92.
101. Id.
102. 2009 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2).
103. 2010 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2).
104. 2011 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2).
105. 2012 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(1)(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2).
106. 2013 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and I(B)(1)-(2).
107. 2014 N.Y. CT. APP. ANN. REP. at §§ I(A)(4) and (I)(B)(1)-(2)
108. See supra notes 87-92, 95-107.
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each year, an increase of 50 percent from the 1998 to 2003
period.109 And, from 2009 to 2014, an average of ninety-five
criminal cases were decided each year, an increase of 58
percent from the period from 1998 to 2003.110
Conclusion
The New York Court of Appeals’ experience demonstrates
how difficult it is to place procedural rules on a court handling
a criminal matter. Indeed, as this paper illustrates, the New
York Court of Appeals, like many other appellate courts that
deal with criminal cases, is still struggling to balance justice
with efficiency.
In New York, the legislature has made clear that it wants
the Court of Appeals to be a court of law and has placed
procedural constraints on the legal issues it can review in
criminal cases, such as permitting it to review preserved
claims.111 However, the legislature’s directive to review only
preserved issues of law is at odds with Court of Appeals’
decisions in which it corrects errors that are not preserved.
Indeed, pure error correction, in the absence of preservation, is
the power of the Appellate Division.
Consequently, to circumvent the statutory preservation
doctrine in New York, the Court of Appeals has relaxed its
interpretation of the rule of preservation so that it can decide
the merits of certain cases. Unsurprisingly, the cost of relaxing
the preservation doctrine in New York has been that the Court
of Appeals now has a heavier caseload and takes longer to
decide cases. Not only is the Court less efficient in resolving
cases, but those individuals whose attorneys fully litigated a
claim, which was incorrectly decided by a judge, have to wait
longer to achieve a just result in their cases. As a result, the
New York criminal justice system is not as efficient it could be.

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. KARGER, supra note 45, at 746; see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 470.05(2)
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